

1 which I'll go over first; and then is a gravity-based
2 component, which has to do with potential for harm and
3 deviation from the regulations.

4 Let me first concentrate a little bit on the economic
5 benefit component. And the reason why we have an -- an
6 economic benefit component is to make sure that -- that
7 EPA or any regulatory agency gets a penalty at least in
8 the amount that an owner and/or operator may have gained
9 because of noncompliance.

10 As an example, if an owner or operator that is trying
11 to do a good job spends the money for equipment and
12 maintenance and so forth, and the guy across the street,
13 or owner and operator, does not put all the equipment, he
14 has or she has an economic benefit; they could sell gas
15 cheaper than the person next door, because they have to
16 spend the money. So what we try to do is level the
17 playing field by at least assessing an economic benefit.

18 Now, the economic benefit is essentially made up of
19 two components itself; one is called "avoided costs,"
20 which are periodic operation and maintenance expenditures
21 that should have been incurred, but were not.

22 As an example, if you were supposed to do a tightness
23 test on your tanks every year, an annual test, and you
24 missed one and you are caught somewhere down the line, you
25 can't go back and make that test for that year; you

1 basically avoided that cost.

2 So essentially, there was an advantage. If the -- if
3 the cost was a thousand dollars for the three tanks, that
4 owner or operator actually has an \$1,000 advantage to do
5 that, and that's an example.

6 The other component of your economic benefit is the
7 fact that there are called "delayed costs." They are
8 costs or the expenditures that have been deferred by the
9 violation, but will be incurred to achieve compliance.

10 Essentially, as an example, if you did not, say,
11 install a -- a corrosion protection system, and we go out
12 and do -- EPA or the state finds they did not -- did not
13 put a corrosion protection system on the tanks, that
14 owner/operator, to get back in compliance, would have to
15 install that piece of equipment anyway.

16 They will not -- they will not avoid it, but they had
17 incurred some savings from the standpoint of capital
18 expenditures that they could have gained by putting it in
19 the bank, making interest, and that type of thing. So
20 what we try to do is take those -- those economic benefits
21 away via penalties.

22 So essentially, if you want to go now in a little bit
23 more detail; determining avoided costs, avoided costs is
24 the avoided expenditure plus the avoided expenditure times
25 the interest, times the number of days over the -- over

1 365 days.

2 You are essentially trying to determine -- and making
3 it more simpler -- what is that interest that they would
4 have incurred if they put the money in the bank. But
5 then, of course, you have to look at their marginal tax
6 rate to see what they would actually save.

7 So as you could say, the avoided expenditures are
8 estimating using local, comparative costs, interest as
9 equity discount.

10 At this point, it's about 7.8, and that's what we
11 used, provided the BEN Model. In the old days, it was
12 18.1 percent, but that, luckily, has gone down quite a
13 bit.

14 It's also based on the number of days of
15 noncompliance, and the 365 is the number of days in a
16 year; and, of course, the marginal tax rate.

17 Now, delayed cost is a little bit different, because
18 you are not talking about the fact that you are saving
19 some money because you didn't spend the money; you
20 actually never would spend the money, so you are trying to
21 recoup that.

22 Delayed expenditures are estimated using local,
23 again, comparative costs.

24 Essentially, delayed cost is your delayed
25 expenditure, times your interest rate, times the number of

1 days, divided by 365 days.

2 And essentially, these are just kind of a general --
3 I mean it's very simplified, but that is the formula that
4 you use.

5 And the numbers you crank in there will vary over
6 time; the interest rates, inflation rates, those type of
7 things will vary. And when I go over the actual counts, I
8 will show you what -- what -- the numbers I used.

9 If anybody has any questions, I guess I will answer
10 them.

11 Now, that is just covering the economic benefit,
12 which, usually -- in the Underground Storage Tank program,
13 is usually quite low. Is that the next -- that is the
14 next --

15 Q So -- that's correct. So your next component --

16 A My next component -- I have covered the economic
17 benefit; in other words, trying to level the playing
18 field. The next part of it is called the gravity-based
19 component.

20 It is based on a deviation from the regulation and
21 potential for harm. It doesn't necessarily mean that you
22 had a leak; it's if you could have -- what happens if you
23 did have a leak.

24 Essentially, as an example, if you did not have
25 release detection in your -- in your -- for your

1 Underground Storage Tanks, even though it did not leak,
2 there's a massive potential there that if it did leak you
3 would never know it, and it could cause quite a few major
4 leaks and cost a lot of expenditures to the taxpayers and
5 to the owner/operator.

6 Now, the gravity-based -- there are different
7 components to the gravity-based. The gravity-based
8 component is based on a matrix value that, again -- and
9 I'll go -- I'll show you the matrix -- but it has to do
10 with deviation from the regulation and potential for harm.

11 And it -- it varies from all the way from a minor --
12 what they call a minor-minor to a major-major. It can go
13 anywhere from \$50 on your matrix, all the way up to
14 \$1,500 for your -- for your matrix.

15 Then there are things called your violator-specific
16 adjustments, which I'll go over, and then your
17 environmental sensitivity multiplier, which is based on:
18 Where is that facility? Are there any type of potable
19 water sources that may be impacted? If it's very
20 sensitive areas, where, say, it's a nature reserve, a
21 preservation, that factor may be higher than just a normal
22 commercial area.

23 Then also, you consider your num -- your days of
24 noncompliance. Those factors all go into calculating
25 your -- your gravity-based component.

1 Again, the matrix value is based on the potential for
2 harm and the deviation from the requirements.

3 The violator-specific adjustments to the matrix are
4 based on the violator's cooperation, willingness, history
5 of noncompliance, and other factors that I will go into.

6 And again, the environmental sensitivity multiplier
7 is based on: Where is this facility? What is close by?
8 Is there a drinking water supply there? Is there a lake,
9 a marina? Any type of thing like that that would cause it
10 to be even more dangerous if there was a -- was a release.

11 And of course, the number of days of violation is
12 also included into this.

13 Okay. Let's just go over the matrix. And again,
14 this matrix is just -- is in the policy. Now, how they
15 developed it, I really don't know.

16 But this Exhibit 4, Matrix Values for Determining the
17 Gravity-Based Component of a Penalty, essentially, what
18 they look at is the extent of deviation from the
19 requirements.

20 If it is a -- is a minor deviation, it will be in
21 this category here. If it's a moderate, it will be in
22 this category. And major.

23 On this side, you have the potential for harm; in
24 other words, if you did not have this -- if you were out
25 of compliance in this particular -- this violation, what

1 would happen if there was a release? What kind of danger
2 would it be?

3 In other words, if you are -- again, example, if
4 you're not keeping a certain specific record, would
5 that -- if you didn't keep that record, would that
6 cause -- would that cause major harm?

7 Well, each -- each violation has been broken down in
8 our policy. Almost all of the -- all -- almost all of the
9 violations have been, not -- not every one has been. But
10 this matrix --

11 Q Mr. Cernerio, if I may interject. What are factors
12 that you look at when you are calculating potential for
13 harm?

14 A You are looking at the -- how much damage,
15 essentially, could be caused by not doing a certain --
16 meeting a certain compliance requirement.

17 For instance, I used the example, if you did not have
18 release detection, the potential for harm is very high,
19 very major, because you would not know if it leaked.

20 Or if you had corrode -- if you did not install
21 corrosion protection on your tank, the potential for harm
22 would be very -- very large, because it's going to rust.

23 Or if you did not have spill and overfill, the
24 potential for harm would be very high, versus maybe a
25 recordkeeping issue would not be that high, and it could

1 requirement and major potential for harm, all the way down
2 to a minor potential for harm and a minor deviation from
3 regulations would be \$50.

4 So these matrix amounts, these nine categories here,
5 will be used first to determine your penalty policy -- or
6 penalty.

7 Q Okay. And then the next set of factors has part of
8 the gravity component.

9 A Yes.

10 Q Would it be on another -- on the next --

11 A Yeah.

12 Q -- demonstrative aid?

13 A And I'm going to go to the next one at this time.

14 Q It's the next --

15 A Now, this is -- this is the violator-specific
16 adjustments. And these have to do with degree of
17 cooperation, noncooperation. And there's more definition
18 in our policy, which I don't think we need to spend too
19 much time going into this; hopefully not.

20 But you can actually give -- you can increase the
21 percentage of the penalty as -- as much as 50 percent
22 increase; in other words, you take the matrix of \$1,500,
23 and if they did not have a -- they were not cooperative --
24 they were -- they were not cooperative, you could actually
25 go in and say I want to increase that \$1,500 by

1 50 percent, or \$750, and you could add \$1,500.

2 So you could take the matrix and make it even larger.
3 Or you can actually go in and make it less, as much as
4 25 percent decrease.

5 So EPA would have the decision and the option to go
6 in and change these factors here depending on the degree
7 of cooperation or noncooperation.

8 The degree of willfulness or neglect can either be
9 increased by 50 percent of the matrix -- the matrix could
10 be increased by 50 percent, or it could be decreased by
11 25 percent, depending on the situation.

12 And again, for a history of noncompliance, you can go
13 all the way up to another 50 percent increase only;
14 there's no decrease.

15 So if you have a -- if you are not cooperating and if
16 you are not doing anything and you are negligent and you
17 are not -- and you have a history of noncompliance, all of
18 these factors will get added in on top of the other.

19 So as you can see, the penalty can get quite high on
20 this -- on this -- using this type of policy. Or you can
21 actually reduce --

22 Q Question: When you do a history of noncompliance, is
23 that a noncompliance in general, or is that noncompliance
24 with respect to the specific violation?

25 A It's -- it's -- has -- this -- these factors here

1 have to do with the -- how the owner and/or operator was
2 interacting: What did they do because of this violation?
3 Was it total neglect? Was it just an oversight? Was --
4 you know, you have to take those into -- into
5 consideration.

6 And the other factors called "other unique factors,"
7 which is basically kind of a catchall, just in case there
8 are other factors that are not in these three, and you can
9 actually increase -- EPA can actually increase the penalty
10 again another 50 percent, or it can decrease it by
11 25 percent.

12 Q Do you have examples of what those other factors
13 might be?

14 A I'm trying to think of -- there could be -- sometimes
15 they put a piece of equipment in, a storm came, knocked it
16 out, it was essentially no fault of anybody, it's just
17 nature did that. Sometimes you can give a discount for
18 that for an owner/operator.

19 Q Would that be called like an act of God, quote
20 unquote?

21 A That type of thing. Or it was just an -- you know,
22 it's really kind of an unusual situation; the equipment
23 was working fine, and all of a sudden lightning hit it,
24 you know, and it went off for a day or two, and it just
25 happened that when we went out there, it was gone, and

1 that type of thing.

2 Q Okay.

3 A Now, one of the things, as far as Region 6 does on
4 these, we normally will not use these factors unless we
5 absolutely have to. We try to keep everything neutral; in
6 other words, don't give an increase, don't give a
7 decrease. Just so you are not raising it up very high and
8 you are not reducing it extremely low. We try to go with
9 the --

10 Q What's the purpose behind that rule of thumb?

11 A It's so that you try to get a good, fair penalty.
12 Because as you can see, adding 50 percent to the matrix
13 and then adding 50 percent again and adding another 50
14 percent, it can be an extremely high penalty.

15 And again, what we try to do is keep a neutral.
16 Unless there are some circumstances where the
17 owner/operator basically just says, "I'm not going to do
18 anything, I'm not -- don't -- you know, you are going to
19 have to take me to court," there's no cooperation, they
20 essentially don't really care about the situation, there's
21 no -- there's no attempt to get the thing corrected, or
22 that their -- or the history of noncompliance is that no
23 matter what you do, this person or this particular company
24 is always out of compliance, then you would probably use
25 something like that.

1 Again, a lot of it is a judgment call. It's very --
2 it's very open. The penalty policy is very wide, so you
3 try to maintain a normalcy when you determine your
4 penalty. You don't want to make it an extremely high
5 penalty, and you are not looking to make it an extremely
6 low penalty. You're trying to be, at least in our region,
7 middle of the road.

8 That is your violator-specific adjustment to the
9 matrix value.

10 Determining the environmental sensitivity multiplier
11 has to do with where is that particular site, what is the
12 potential for harm to some sensitive areas?

13 If you are out in the middle of nowhere, out in the
14 middle of the desert, most likely, there's not an
15 sensitive issue, you can use the 1 factor, which does not
16 increase your penalty; it keeps it neutral, again.

17 However, you could be in a situation, say, in
18 Louisiana, where you are going to impact a coastal area or
19 some kind of everglade or some type of thing like that
20 where it -- the potential for harm to the environment --
21 human health and the environment, endangered species, you
22 may want to use a factor of 2.

23 And again, we use the lowest we can, unless
24 there's -- like unless it's right next to some kind of
25 water well where it was a very sensitive area, we would

1 normally use 1 or 1 1/2.

2 So these factors are allowable under our penalty
3 policy. We use them at our discretion; however, the
4 attempt is not to make a huge penalty, it's to try to keep
5 it fair and reasonable.

6 And again, the other factor, which -- which does
7 cause the penalty to be quite high is the number of days
8 of noncompliance; it's a multiplier.

9 And it's just a schedule, essentially anywhere from
10 zero to 90 days out of compliance, if they were out of
11 compliance anywhere from zero to three months, the factor
12 is 1, so you are not getting penalized for anything from
13 zero to 90 days.

14 You go over -- between 91 days and half a year, six
15 months, that factor goes to 1.5. If you are going from
16 181 to 270, which is nine months, it would be a factor of
17 2. And anywhere from a year or less would be a factor of
18 2.5.

19 If it goes over a year, then for every six months
20 that it goes over, then you add another .5. So as you can
21 see, if it's a four- or five-year violation, it's going to
22 run up to almost a 5 or 6 factor, which is going to be
23 very expensive.

24 Now, of course, the EPA has a statute of limitations,
25 so you can't go back more than five years, so that's one

1 of the ways of keeping the penalty down.

2 Okay.

3 Q And then that's the -- that's -- that's the end of
4 those exhibits?

5 A That -- well, no. I think the end --

6 Q Well, the next one gets into the counts.

7 A Okay. I thought there was a basic formula, too,
8 there.

9 Well, the basic formula is you add in your -- your
10 economic benefit penalty component, and then you add in
11 your gravity, and that's your penalty.

12 Q Okay. Thank you, Mr. Cernero. You can now return to
13 your seat, I believe. So I have a couple more questions
14 for you, and then we'll get into Count 1.

15 Against whom do you ordinarily assess penalties?

16 A Excuse me?

17 Q Against whom do you ordinarily assess penalties?

18 A The regulated community, violators.

19 Q Who -- who does the statute allow you to assess a
20 penalty against?

21 A The -- the statutory -- the --

22 Q Against whom does --

23 A Oh, I'm sorry; against owners and/or operators. The
24 EPA has the authority to go after owners and/or operators.

25 Q Okay.

1 A Not contractors or anybody else, but owners and
2 operators.

3 Q Does the statute allow an owner and operator to
4 transfer liability of a penalty to a third-party
5 contractor?

6 A No.

7 Q What ensures fairness of the penalty assessment among
8 the regulated community?

9 A Trying to -- the way they tries (sic) to keep it even
10 is to use a common penalty policy.

11 Q Do you look to what has been done in previous cases
12 when you assess a penalty to ensure fairness, or do you
13 only look to the policy?

14 A I -- I don't look at other cases, because each case
15 is unique in itself, and I just have to go by the penalty
16 policy.

17 Q Okay. Well, what are factors that cause penalty
18 assessments to vary in different cases?

19 A Again, it has to do with the violator-specific
20 factors, the days of noncompliance; obviously, for the
21 number of counts you may have, the number of violations,
22 the number of tanks you have, the number of facilities.
23 There's so many things that can -- that could affect
24 the -- the magnitude of the penalty.

25 Q Earlier, you heard Mr. Pashia testify regarding field

1 citations, and you heard Respondent's counsel ask
2 questions regarding field citations. Do field citations
3 cause penalty assessments to be different?

4 A Field citations is a totally different method of
5 enforcement. Field citations was developed by Region 6
6 to -- from the standpoint that we had a large university
7 of regulated -- a large universe of regulated community,
8 it was very difficult to get to every one of them.

9 So we tried to develop a field citation program, or a
10 traffic cop type violation, a ticket book, where you can
11 go, do your inspection. If you find some -- the minor
12 violations, there are criteria that you have to use before
13 you can use a ticket. You know, if there's a leak that's
14 discovered, you can't use a ticket.

15 If there's so many violations at this facility or
16 they have a huge history of noncompliance, you may not be
17 able to use the ticket.

18 The field citation is at the discretion of the
19 inspector. Hopefully, what you try to do is get
20 compliance within a 30- to 60-day period, assess a small
21 fine anywhere from \$50 to as much as about \$3,000.

22 There are no attorneys involved in it; no offense,
23 but there's no attorneys involved in it. It is done by
24 the inspector and the enforcement officer. When they come
25 back to the office, they can either -- either do it on the

1 spot, or they can actually mail it to the owner/operator.

2 Hopefully, that the owner/operator will accept the
3 offer of settlement. Essentially, EPA agrees to take no
4 further action on that particular violation or violations,
5 as long as the owner would get it back in compliance
6 within 30 to 60 days, pay the penalty, and EPA will sign
7 off -- they will sign off on the order, and we will sign
8 off on it to take no further action.

9 That is not required that they have to take the
10 offer, it's just an offer of settlement, hopefully to
11 resolve the issue without having to go through a formal
12 complaint.

13 It is a totally different method of enforcement. The
14 penalties that are determined in the field citation are
15 set forth just like you would have as a traffic cop:
16 Speeding would be this much, you know, you know, parking
17 in a non-parking zone would be this much. There's no
18 calculating --

19 Q Do you have --

20 A -- of the penalty.

21 Q Right. I'm sorry, I cut you off. Do you have a rule
22 of thumb for when you use field citations versus an
23 administrative complaint?

24 A Yes. Normally use a field citation when this is
25 basically a new facility or a new owner, you don't have a

1 big history of -- of noncompliance, it is a way --
2 particularly, if it's minor violations that can be
3 corrected within a 30- to 60-day period.

4 If it's a very major issue where they got to pull
5 tanks and -- or add a lot of equipment on that's going to
6 take many months, then you may not want to use that field
7 citation.

8 It's a very way -- it's also a screening tool. If
9 they get in compliance, then there's no need to go to a
10 complaint.

11 Q Okay. And are there other penalty assessments or
12 ways to collect a penalty that are different from -- in
13 value than what is alleged in your initial complaint? And
14 maybe my question is not clear.

15 A No, I'm not understanding what you're saying.

16 Q Okay. Are there other mechanisms for assessing a
17 penalty for UST violations that would have the penalty
18 even lower than what is usually seen in administrative
19 complaints?

20 A No. The only two -- only two tools we have for
21 actually assessing penalties is the field citation, and
22 the formal complaint using the UST penalty policy.

23 Q Have you been involved in the settlement of an
24 administrative complaint?

25 A Yes.

1 Q In UST?

2 A Many. Many of them, yes.

3 Q Okay. And in those settlements, do you settle for a
4 value less than what you plead in your complaint?

5 A Yes. Sometimes.

6 Q Let us turn our attention to Count 1.

7 A Okay.

8 THE COURT: Maybe, Ms. Beaver, this would be a
9 good time to take our noon recess. And we'll recess
10 for one hour.

11 *****

12 (A lunch break was taken, after which the
13 following continued:)

14 THE COURT: The hearing will be in order.

15 You may resume the stand, Mr. Cernero.

16 THE WITNESS: Okay. Okay. Can y'all see this?

17 MS. BEAVER: Wait. Hold on, John, I'm not
18 there.

19 THE WITNESS: Oh, you got to get there?

20 MS. BEAVER: I got to get there.

21 THE WITNESS: Do you want me to sit down?

22 MS. BEAVER: Don't start without me, yes,
23 please.

24

25

1 (An off-the-record conversation was held, after
2 which the following continued:)

3 Q (By Ms. Beaver:) Okay, Mr. Cernero. We finished off
4 last time with you going through, generally, the penalty
5 policy and how a penalty is calculated.

6 And for a point of clarification, how does
7 subsequent -- how does the information regarding
8 subsequent -- subsequent repairs or modifications factor
9 into penalty consideration?

10 A It wouldn't, because if -- to correct the violation
11 is something that should have been done in the first
12 place, so it's covered by the fact that you are giving
13 them an economic penalty. Fixing things after the fact
14 doesn't -- doesn't do anything for your penalty policy.

15 Q Even though -- you said "economic penalty." Do you
16 mean --

17 A Economic benefit, I'm sorry.

18 Q So say -- tell me again, how does subsequent repairs
19 and modifications factor into economic benefit?

20 A Because those are the things that they should have
21 done, and that's when -- that's why we've calculated an
22 economic benefit.

23 We have that penalty in that -- in there already, so
24 we are not going to give anybody any credit for the fact
25 that they fix it after the fact. It should have been

1 fixed from the very beginning. It's something that they
2 should have been doing from the very beginning.

3 Q Okay. What about the cooperation factor? Does the
4 fact that they, you know, as in response to a complaint,
5 have now -- someone who has now made subsequent repairs or
6 modifications, does that information show cooperation,
7 based on that cooperation factor?

8 A No. According to the penalty policy, that is not
9 considered cooperation, or -- essentially, the policy says
10 that when you go above and beyond what is required by the
11 regulations, then you could give some -- some leeway in
12 reducing the penalty.

13 But those would be something more like you decided to
14 implement some kind of an auditing procedure where you're
15 going to go above and beyond. Or you're going to add --
16 say, for instance, you are going to tear out all your old
17 piping and tear out all your old tanks and put in
18 double-walled Fiberglas piping and state of the art tanks,
19 that actually was going above and beyond what is
20 required -- the minimum requirement.

21 Q Okay.

22 A Then you can give some kind of an economic -- or not
23 economic -- you can give some kind of reduction in your
24 penalty.

25 Q Okay. Great. Thank you so much. So now, let's turn

1 to Count 1.

2 A Okay.

3 Q Of your penalty. And again, for this part of the
4 discussion, we do have demonstrative aids --

5 A Okay.

6 Q -- for each count, and the penalty that -- and these
7 aids are enlargements of what appears in the exhibits.

8 Now, for Count 1, walk us through, Mr. Cernero --

9 A Okay.

10 Q -- how you calculated the penalty for Count 1.

11 A Okay. I --

12 Q But before that, remind us what Count 1 is.

13 A Okay.

14 Q And what facility it is.

15 A Okay. Count 1 is "Failure to Provide Spill

16 Prevention for New Tanks." This is at the Citgo, the
17 first one, Citgo Quik Stop.

18 Essentially, the economic benefit component was based
19 on only a delay, since -- if you recall, since the spill
20 buckets, they had to be installed anyway, they couldn't be
21 avoided.

22 I used the cost of approximately \$1,000 per UST, was
23 considered a reasonable cost to replace the spill buckets.

24 Using a discount rate of 7.8 percent, an inflation
25 rate of 3 percent, and a tax rate of about 38.9 percent.

1 It was like -- something like 1,600 days of delay.

2 Delayed costs ended to be about \$137.98 per tank,
3 making the total economic benefit component of \$413.93.

4 The economic and gravity base was calculated as
5 follows. I wanted to cover the economic benefit first,
6 because it's not really that descriptive in this.

7 Q Mr. Cernerero.

8 A Yes.

9 Q A quick question. The avoided costs -- you did zero
10 for avoided costs.

11 A That is correct.

12 Q And you used -- so you used delayed costs, and I
13 believe you explained why you did the delayed costs.

14 A Right.

15 Q My question is, what was your basis for selecting the
16 number that you used for delayed costs?

17 A The number?

18 Q For delayed costs. What was your basis? Let's do
19 the number that you started out with and put into that
20 formula. What was your basis for that number?

21 A This is the matrix, okay? That -- is that what you
22 are talking about, the matrix?

23 Q Your economic benefit, delayed costs.

24 A Oh, okay.

25 Q You just started with economic benefit, correct?

1 A Right. I started with the economic, right. And --

2 Q And you explained how you came up with the number
3 \$413.94 --

4 A Right.

5 Q -- for economic benefit. You had zero for delayed --
6 for avoided costs.

7 A Right.

8 Q And your number for delayed cost was 137.98.

9 A Right.

10 Q Correct?

11 A Per tank.

12 Q Per tank?

13 A Right.

14 Q And my question is, the amount that you used for
15 delayed costs per tank, what was your basis for selecting
16 that number?

17 A Based on the penalty policy, and also checking with
18 our headquarters on what the inflation rate is and what
19 the discount rate is, and also what the standard tax rate
20 is, which is in the -- it's in the formula when you do the
21 calculation.

22 You have to make those adjustments, because you have
23 to consider the inflation, you have to consider the
24 discount rate. All those things change over time, so I
25 tried to use the latest information I -- I can, according

1 to the penalty policy.

2 Q Okay. That's fine. The delayed -- so if I'm -- if
3 I'm remembering this correctly, based on the chart for
4 determining delayed costs, there is a delayed expenditures
5 amount, then you multiply it by interest and the number of
6 days.

7 A Right.

8 Q And the delayed expenditures amount is what you
9 used -- estimated using local and comparable costs?

10 A Right. And I essentially have to use those -- those
11 factors that are actually given to us by headquarters.
12 Headquarters says, "here is the latest inflation rate you
13 should use, here is the discount rate you should be using,
14 and here is the -- the tax rate that you should be using
15 for -- for Oklahoma."

16 Q Okay.

17 A Yeah.

18 Q Okay. Thanks for clarifying that.

19 A Yeah. Now, I had a typo over here. Actually, this
20 is supposed to be 413.93, so that was -- there's a typo
21 there.

22 So essentially, there is no avoided cost, because I
23 got to -- you got to do something to get back in
24 compliance.

25 The delayed cost is essentially \$137.98 per tank;

1 ends up to be \$413.92, even though this is a typo. Now,
2 that is just economic benefit.

3 The gravity base is by taking that matrix for that
4 particular violation, which is \$1,500, it's a major-major.
5 Now, failure to have spill buckets is a major component of
6 the Underground Storage Tank program; therefore, the
7 deviation -- or the potential for harm by not having such
8 a piece of equipment in place, you can cause potential for
9 harm because you can cause contamination over time, spill
10 after spill after spill.

11 And also, it is completely away from the deviation;
12 you don't have any spill bucket there at all, so that's a
13 major-major.

14 Now, we did not use any violator-specific
15 adjustments; essentially, what I call a neutral. I did
16 not increase the penalty by any factors or decrease it by
17 any factors. So essentially, the factor for the
18 violator-specific would just be 1. There would not be
19 any -- any type of adjustment.

20 Now, based on the fact that where those stations are
21 in McAlester is in a commercial area, it's not where
22 there's potable water or a situation where there's going
23 to be some kind of wildlife, we use the minimal
24 sensitivity factor of 1; again, trying to be as lenient
25 as -- as allowable under the penalty policy.

1 Now, however, we still have to deal with the number
2 of days of noncompliance. The tanks were put in somewhere
3 around 1990, so basically, the violation occurred from
4 19 -- whatever it was, put in 1990, until the day that --
5 at least till the day I got there that that was out of
6 compliance.

7 However, because of the statute -- statutation of
8 limitations -- the statute of limitations, we are not
9 going to go back more than five years; therefore, we use
10 the date of September 30th of 19 -- or 2000.

11 However, that still constitutes about 1,600 days of
12 noncompliance, and the multiplier ends up to be a 6. So
13 that's one of the reasons why the penalty is -- is quite
14 high.

15 Now, if you multiplied the numbers out to 1,500 times
16 the 1 for the violator-specific adjustments, 1 for the
17 environmental sensitivity adjustments, and then 6 for the
18 days of noncompliance times the three tanks, you end up
19 with 20,000 -- \$27,000 in penalties for just Count 1.

20 Q And can you remind us why you multiplied by three
21 tanks?

22 A Well, because the penalty is based on -- because of
23 the statutory factors, you base it on per tank per day of
24 violation, so you go by tank.

25 And that's why we used -- it's a violation for each

1 tank. Each tank did not have the spill bucket it was
2 supposed to, so we go by tank.

3 Q Okay.

4 A Now, once you get the economic -- the gravity base,
5 you -- you add back in your economic base, and you ended
6 up with \$27,413.93. And it may be a penny or two off
7 here, because of the typo that I have.

8 THE COURT: Well, Mr. Cernerero, isn't that
9 regarding those tanks as having no -- no spill
10 buckets at all, when in fact, they did have?

11 THE WITNESS: They had -- the problem there is
12 they had two ports that could be filled from either
13 part of it. If -- if they had spill -- they did have
14 spill buckets on the south end; and as long as they
15 dropped fuel there, there would be no spill.

16 However, there's nothing to prohibit an owner or
17 a truck driver to go in and make an erroneous drop
18 and then have a spill. So therefore, it's got two
19 drop ports, it should have two spill buckets.

20 THE COURT: Yes.

21 THE WITNESS: This happens quite often in
22 military. They go -- they have two places where they
23 can fill it; I don't know why they do it. In this
24 particular case, I understand that it was in the way
25 of traffic or whatever, and they started using the

1 south part of it. But essentially, they had spill
2 buckets that were not there. And they were not
3 there --

4 THE COURT: It still seems like the possibility
5 of a truck driver misplacing it, though, and trying
6 to fill from the north port -- from the other port
7 that doesn't have the spill bucket, isn't that
8 minimized by the fact there are some spill buckets
9 there?

10 THE WITNESS: I would say no, because just one
11 drop -- if they mess up and drop and just put the
12 fuel in that one area and they have a spill, then you
13 had the potential for -- you had the release, you
14 would have an overflow or a spill.

15 And there's nothing -- I mean those -- those --
16 the fill ports they had, even though they had a lock
17 on one, it's not unusual to see locks on -- on the
18 caps; as a matter of fact, most of the time I go
19 there, I see -- I see locks on the caps.

20 So that's a normal procedure, because a lot of
21 people don't want to get their -- their gasoline
22 stolen, so they have locks on them. And a lot of the
23 truck drivers, they do have keys or they go in and
24 get the key.

25 If they wanted to say that this -- these fill

1 ports are not to be used as fill port -- as the
2 drop -- drops for fuel, they should have had a
3 permanent cap on or a cap that's threaded that does
4 not even appear to be as a regular cap.

5 And that's what was on their -- you'll see our
6 pictures; they had regular caps on them, they -- they
7 look just like any other cap.

8 There was no indication that there was a sign on
9 there that said, "do not fill." There was nothing in
10 there, or a bolted-down lid, or any type of
11 indication that a driver would be able to determine
12 that he -- they -- they should not -- they should not
13 deliver to this product.

14 And also, it could be a situation where they
15 were not able to get to those fill ports that were --
16 did have spill buckets; there might have been traffic
17 on that or cars parked there, and they would be
18 forced to use those other side (sic).

19 So what I'm saying is that the potential for
20 some truck driver inadvertently using that is pretty
21 high in this case.

22 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Cernero.

23 You may proceed, Ms. Beaver.

24 MS. BEAVER: Thank you, Your Honor.

25 THE WITNESS: Okay. So that, basically, is how

1 we calculate Count 1.

2 Q (By Ms. Beaver:) Okay. What's -- do you have
3 information on the location for proximity to people? You
4 mentioned that this Citgo Quik Mart was in an industrial
5 area.

6 A A commercial area, yeah.

7 Q Pardon? A commercial area?

8 A Commercial area, yes.

9 Q Do you have -- can you kind of provide an idea of the
10 proximity to people; to residential development or to
11 people?

12 A As far as residential, I don't think there was that
13 many in that area. But it is harmful because there is a
14 lot of traffic through those stations. If there was a
15 spill, it could -- I mean it could get into the soil and
16 continue to cause contamination.

17 Also, the other issue, too, is if there was a spill
18 on the concrete away from the spill bucket, you know, it's
19 going to go right into the soil. There's nothing to catch
20 it there.

21 But, of course, that's not part of the requirements.
22 But the fact is that you could -- you could, over a period
23 of time, continue to have contamination.

24 As a matter of fact, if you look at the pictures,
25 it's possible that there was some contamination there.

1 Now, I'm not going to say I took samples and I know
2 there's contamination, but by looking at the pictures, you
3 could see some -- it looks like some soil staining, some
4 concrete staining that could indicate that there was some
5 drops at that particular -- that particular drop.

6 Q Okay. Thank you. We can move on now --

7 A Okay.

8 Q -- to Count 2.

9 A All right. Count 2 was --

10 Q If you can --

11 A -- was "Failure to Adequately -- Provide Adequate
12 Capacity for Spill Prevention."

13 This was the situation where the spill buckets were
14 filled with either fuel or debris or both, such that the
15 capacity was reduced, that you would not have sufficient
16 capacity.

17 Essentially, in this case, there was no -- we did not
18 see that in this case there would be much of an economic
19 benefit, other than you have to spend some time cleaning
20 out the buckets and that type of thing, which would be so
21 minimal, it wasn't even worth looking at the economic
22 benefit. So the economic benefit in this case was
23 basically zero. There was really no -- no advantage.

24 However, because of the gravity part of it, because
25 there could have been the potential for a spill, we said

1 that this was a major-major; in other words, major harm --
2 major potential for harm and major deviation from the
3 requirements. It has to have sufficient capacity.

4 Q Could you explain again why it's major-major?

5 A Because -- because of the fact that the capacity
6 was -- was considerably or significantly reduced. If
7 there was a spill because of the hose being released too
8 soon, you would have had product out on the concrete and
9 spread -- not only cause contamination, but could cause
10 some fire hazard and whatever, some -- some danger there.

11 And also, the potential from -- or the deviation from
12 the requirements is that you must have sufficient capacity
13 to make sure that you have enough capacity when the hose
14 is released, that it will hold -- it will hold enough
15 product.

16 Now, if you look at a standard spill bucket, it's
17 about five gallons. And if you -- if you -- if the hose
18 was completely full, it's going to -- completely full and
19 it's about a 15-foot length of hose, it would hold about
20 15-gallons.

21 So the spill buckets aren't even there to hold a full
22 hose after being filled; it's basically just to cut --
23 to -- basically to hold what's there, as far as spilling
24 is concerned.

25 And that's usually anywhere from three to five

1 gallons, three to four gallons. And that's why you don't
2 want to reduce the capacity, because you have debris in
3 there.

4 So the matrix on this particular case was -- was
5 \$1,500. We did not use any type of violator-specific.

6 We used a 1 -- the sensitivity was 1; however, they
7 did have -- the date now -- unfortunately, there was a
8 typo on this one. There -- no, this is -- that's correct,
9 it was one day of violation. We just looked at it as a
10 one-day violation.

11 Q And you looked at it as one day, because?

12 A It was a day -- I mean I don't know if it was that
13 way when I got there, before I got there. It may have
14 happened over -- I would assume it happened over months,
15 but I don't know that, so I just said one day.

16 Q So would you call that enforcement discretion? Or
17 how would you phrase that?

18 A Just enforcement discretion. Try to give them the
19 minimum amount. I said: Well, I know it's there when I
20 got there, that's one day violation, so we used the factor
21 of 1.

22 MS. BEAVER: Your Honor, at this time, I'd like
23 to call the Court's attention and Respondent's
24 attention and have the record reflect that what we
25 are talking about right now is Complainant's

1 Exhibits -- pictures regarding this count are
2 Complainant's Exhibits 24 and 25.

3 Q (By Ms. Beaver:) Based on the pictures that you
4 took, Mr. Cernero, explain why the potential for harm and
5 the extent of deviation was so great, based on the
6 pictures that you took.

7 A The fact is that there's -- there was so little
8 capacity left, because of the debris and/or fuel in there,
9 if there was a spill because the truck driver released a
10 hose too soon, there would not be enough capacity to hold
11 the minimal that's usually in a hose, even after they shut
12 the flow of fuel to the hose.

13 It would have caused an overflow. Which one of the
14 reasons why EPA even requires spill and overflow is to
15 prevent the continual spilling or overflowing of fuel.

16 Now, you have one time -- one spill, you know, one
17 year is not necessarily going to be total contamination,
18 but over a period of time, it will be.

19 Q Okay. And how much capacity do you -- would you
20 speculate was left in the -- in this -- these spill
21 buckets?

22 A It looked like it was almost completely full, so I
23 would say it would be, you know, maybe a gallon it could
24 hold; that's about it.

25 Q That it could hold about a gallon more?

1 A That's about it. But, you know, your typical excess
2 in the hose after it's shut off is anywhere from, you
3 know, two to three gallons or more.

4 Q Okay. So you walked us through economic benefit of
5 Count 2.

6 A Right.

7 Q And you have been walking us through your gravity
8 component for Count 2.

9 A Essentially, it was \$1,500 times six tanks, ends up
10 being \$9,000.

11 There was no -- we did not -- the economic benefit to
12 this was so insignificant, we didn't even consider it.
13 Just it wasn't -- it wasn't worth trying to come up with
14 an economic benefit.

15 Q And so your -- you multiplied by six tanks. Did you
16 multiply by six tanks to reflect what was happening in the
17 spill buckets for each tank?

18 A Yes. Yes. And of course, the three -- the other
19 three had two spill buckets each, but they didn't have
20 spill buckets, so I couldn't give them -- you know, I
21 couldn't say anything there.

22 Q Was it customary -- in your experience as doing
23 inspections, is it customary to find spill buckets with
24 that much of product in it or debris in it?

25 A No, it is not. And they are -- it's not unusual to

1 see, you know, little bits of debris in there and some
2 fuel. But this case was so severe, it caught my
3 attention. In my 17 years of inspections, I've never seen
4 spill buckets filled to this capacity before, such that it
5 was -- they had rags and filth and, you know, just trash
6 in there.

7 It looks like it was used to -- apparently, somebody
8 must have been hosing down the concrete and everything
9 went in the bucket and that's where it stayed. I don't
10 know if that was the situation; I'm just speculating.

11 But it was so severe that I -- that I noted that.
12 And also, I believe -- I believe also, the inspector from
13 OCC noticed it, too. And we both agreed that -- at least
14 in my opinion, we both agreed that it was significant
15 enough to -- to say it was a violation.

16 Q Okay. Thank you, Mr. Cernero. Let's move on to
17 Count 3.

18 A Count 3 and 4 on this part?

19 Q Yeah, 3 and 4 are on the other side of the chart. So
20 let's start with Count 3.

21 A Okay. Count 3 was "Failure to Conduct Release
22 Detection on a Temporarily Closed Tank." Same station
23 again, the Citgo Quik Stop.

24 Again, there was no -- in this case, there was no
25 economic benefit to this one. We did not feel that the --

1 although there was some cost incurred, you know, they
2 should have been sticking the tanks, we still felt that
3 the labor in that was probably not significant to consider
4 it, so we did not put the economic benefit in this one.
5 However --

6 Q Mr. Cernerero, I'm sorry, clarify for me. I just heard
7 you say they should have been sticking the tanks. Are we
8 dealing with sticking the tanks, or conducting monthly
9 release detection monitoring?

10 A Well, no, I --

11 Q Or is that the same thing?

12 A No, you are right; I'm sorry. It was "Failure to
13 Conduct Release Detection on a Temporarily Closed Tank."
14 And it would not be using the stick; I'm sorry.

15 It would be the labor that would be normal for going
16 out and monitoring the facility -- that particular tank.
17 So that's why I was saying the economic benefit was
18 insignificant, not worth even calculating it; that's why I
19 left it out, although there would be, you know,
20 technically would be something there.

21 The fact that they were not -- this -- this
22 particular tank was claimed to be in temporary closure by
23 the owner and by the operator that was there; however,
24 when we did the stick readings, there was product in
25 there.

1 The OCC inspector and I verified that there was
2 product in there, and I think it was eight or nine inches
3 of product in there; therefore, they were required to do
4 some type of release detection.

5 Again, failure to do release detection is a very
6 major potential for harm and a major deviation from the
7 requirements; therefore, again, it was used as a matrix of
8 1,500.

9 Q Mr. Cernerio, why was it a major deviation from the
10 reg requirements?

11 A Because the regs require that -- that any -- even
12 tanks in temporary closure, if there's product in it, must
13 be monitored every 30 days, as long as there's product in
14 there.

15 And failure to do that -- if they fail to do that and
16 there was a release, you would not know that it released,
17 because you would not know that there was -- that you were
18 not checking the monitor -- you were not monitoring;
19 therefore, you would not know it was released.

20 So it continued -- it would continue -- all that nine
21 inches of product would have been released into the
22 environment, so there was a potential for harm, major
23 potential for harm.

24 Q To clarify, the extent of deviation from requirements
25 does not require -- does it require release?

1 A Right.

2 Q When you calculate extent deviation from the
3 requirements, do you require a release?

4 A No.

5 Q No?

6 A It does not have to release, no.

7 Q So your extent deviation from the requirement is
8 major because?

9 A Because the regs say you must have release detection.
10 There was no release detection.

11 Q Okay.

12 A Okay?

13 Q And the --

14 A That's deviation from the requirement. Deviation
15 from the harm was that there was a potential there for
16 harm, a major potential for harm.

17 And although it did not -- we are not saying that it
18 did leak, there was a potential for harm because no one
19 was monitoring that particular tank with nine inches of
20 product in it.

21 Q Okay.

22 A For -- for sev -- probably for over a year.

23 Q What period did you calculate this penalty for?

24 A Okay.

25 Q Your days --

1 A I calculated --

2 Q I'm skipping ahead --

3 A I calculated --

4 Q -- to the days of noncompliance.

5 A I calculated -- based on the fact that you are only
6 required to keep 12 months' worth of data, I said that the
7 compliance should be one year.

8 Even at the time that I was there, they were out of
9 compliance. So essentially, I took the one year plus one
10 day, 366 days, which should have been a factor of 3, based
11 on the penalty policy.

12 Q Okay. I notice -- and for the record, on Count 3 in
13 our exhibits, it shows a period of violation that says
14 03-01 of 2000 to 5-24 of 2004, which equals 1,545 days of
15 noncompliance. Would you explain the discrepancy in
16 what's noted in the summary --

17 A Yeah.

18 Q -- there?

19 A Yeah, this is a -- this is a typo; it was due to cut
20 and pasting. It should have been just 366 days. It
21 should have been from February 16th, '04, to
22 February 16th, '05.

23 And the fact that they were still out of compliance
24 there, we used 360 (sic). We tried to be a lenient as
25 possible with the -- with the penalty policies; therefore,

1 we used 366 days.

2 The factor for 366 days is 3. Multiply it out, and
3 you come up with the fact that it was \$1,500 for the
4 matrix. All the factors were 1 except the factor for the,
5 you know, the multiplier for the date. One tank -- there
6 was only one tank, a diesel, a 12,000-gallon diesel tank,
7 and it ended up being \$4,500 for the penalty.

8 Q Is this calculation correct, irrespective of the
9 typo --

10 A Yeah.

11 Q -- of the date range there?

12 A Right. This is the only place where we got the typo.
13 For some reason, this got in there and it shouldn't have
14 been in there. But the -- the factor is right and the --
15 and the penalty amount is correct.

16 Q Okay. We can move on to Count 4.

17 A Okay. Count 4 was "Failure to Conduct Monthly
18 Release Detection Monitoring for Tanks," for the remaining
19 five -- the other five tanks that were at this site.

20 The economic benefit based component was evaluated
21 for avoided costs and delayed costs. Only the avoided
22 costs was considered in this count.

23 Since RAM did not conduct acceptable monthly release
24 detection for at least one year, it was estimated that the
25 capital expenditure of \$5,000 was delayed in installing an

1 Automatic Tank Gauging equipment to conduct monthly
2 release detection properly.

3 Using a discount rate of the 7.8, with 3 percent
4 inflation, 38.9 percent, and 366 days of avoidance, the
5 avoided cost was \$145.89 per UST, making the economic
6 benefit total of \$729.45 for the gravity -- for the -- I'm
7 sorry, for the economic benefit.

8 Essentially, what I was saying, the method of release
9 detection that they were using was the Inventory Control
10 and Tank Tightness Testing method, which in this
11 particular circumstance was not allowed because the tank
12 was put in in 1990.

13 You can only use that method for 10 years afterwards.
14 So they were going beyond the deadline for coming up with
15 a monthly monitoring system.

16 Now, I used an Automatic Tank Gauging because that's
17 normally what people use. That doesn't necessarily mean
18 they had to go with an Automatic Tank Gauging; they could
19 have went with some other monitoring device. However,
20 even that would have probably been about a
21 \$5,000 investment, maybe more, maybe less. I had to use
22 the best judgment I could.

23 Based on that, the gravity-based component for the
24 matrix -- again, the fact that they were not doing a
25 release detection that was allowable under the regs, there

1 were major -- major deviation from the regs.. Also a major
2 potential for harm, because they were not -- this method
3 of release detection, the sticking and the -- and the
4 testing of the tanks is basically a permanent -- was a --
5 was a temporary fix.

6 That's why they said in the regulations you can only
7 use this method of release detection for 10 years after
8 upgrade or 10 years after installation.

9 Q So was it possible for Respondent to have upgraded --

10 A No.

11 Q -- the tanks --

12 A No.

13 Q -- and be able to continue using that method?

14 A No, because the tank was not upgraded. It was
15 considered a new tank because it was installed after
16 December 22nd, 1988. It had to have all the bells and
17 whistles on it when it went in the ground.

18 Q Is this true for all six tanks at this facility, at
19 the Citgo Quik Mart?

20 A My understanding, yes. I don't have my notes in
21 front of me, but I understand all the tanks were put in in
22 1990. I will have to look at my notes and see if that's
23 correct, but I believe that's so.

24 Actually, this -- it would be the five tanks in
25 this -- in this instance.

1 Q Right. In this count, there are five tanks.

2 A Right.

3 Q Question: In Count 4, you assess an economic
4 benefit, and Count 3, there was not economic benefit
5 assessed. Could you explain why?

6 A Yes, because this particular one, you had to install
7 something.

8 THE COURT: That's Count 3?

9 THE WITNESS: Huh?

10 THE COURT: That's Count 3, you had to install
11 something?

12 THE WITNESS: Count 3 was the --

13 Q (By Ms. Beaver:) Count 3, the same caption of
14 violation: "Failure to Conduct Monthly Release
15 Detection"; however, Count 3, it was for a tank that was
16 supposedly in temporary enclosure.

17 A Right.

18 Q In Count 4, it was for the five tanks not in
19 temporary closure.

20 A But this was the -- that's correct. This was in
21 temporary closure. If the tank was empty, they wouldn't
22 have had to have done anything.

23 So really, if they would have just not had any
24 product in that tank, no more than an inch, there would
25 not have to have been anything here.

1 However, this one, the Count 4, as to the other five
2 tanks that were in operation, there would have had to have
3 been some kind of capital expenditure to be able to have a
4 monthly release detection.

5 So yet again, trying to be lenient on 3, I did not
6 include any type of economic benefit in this one, but I
7 did in this one, because something was going to have to be
8 done here.

9 Q Okay. Mr. Cernero, what, if anything, can be taken
10 into consideration in your penalty, given the fact that
11 Respondent alleges that they were doing something, they
12 were doing a method of testing.

13 Could the fact that they were doing a method of
14 testing be taken into consideration in your penalty
15 calculation?

16 A According to the regulation, using this method is not
17 the correct method of release detection. Not only that is
18 that it has been going on -- it was supposed to have
19 stopped in 2000. This is five years later. I cannot see
20 that that would be considered as an acceptable method of
21 release detection.

22 Also, the fact is, you only have to test the tanks
23 once every five years under that method. But yet that
24 method, the Inventory Control and Tank Tightness Testing
25 method, was never meant to be a permanent type of monthly

1 monitoring. It was -- it was allowed, but only for 10
2 years, because considering that tanks that were more than
3 10 years old should not be using that method.

4 Q And is that the case for a new tank and an existing
5 tank?

6 A A new tank and an upgraded tank; you know, all of
7 these have 10 years. And again, keep in mind, these tanks
8 were put in in 1990. They were already -- they were
9 already 15 years old -- 16 years old -- yeah, 15 years old
10 when I was there. They were continually using that
11 method, after -- I mean after all these years.

12 So again, a tank of that age should not -- in
13 accordance with regulations, should not be using this
14 method, because it's not -- it's -- it has not been proven
15 that that type of -- that leaks down to .1 gallon per hour
16 could not be detected by this. Or .2 gallon. I'm sorry;
17 .2 gallon per hour could be detected with this method.

18 Given the fact that it's an older tank, the regs say
19 you can't use it; and essentially, as far as I'm
20 concerned, if it was one day or maybe you are still using
21 it maybe a year later or six months later, it may have
22 been considered, but now you are talking about it was
23 used, you know, five years after the fact that they
24 weren't supposed to be using it.

25 Q Did you have any notice that any of the -- any of

1 these five tanks were in temporary closure?

2 A No.

3 Q Was there ever any indication or notes that would
4 evidence that these five tanks were under temporary
5 closure?

6 A No. They were -- they -- as far as I was concerned,
7 they were active. There was product being sold. The only
8 one that I was able to say well, it probably was, was the
9 diesel; however, it still had nine inches of product in
10 it. And thus, it had to have some kind of release
11 detection.

12 And again, they could have remedied it very easily;
13 as soon as they put it in temporary closure is to pull
14 the -- all the product out of it. They would never had to
15 worry about measuring the product in that tank.

16 Q And what was your basis -- going back now to Count 3,
17 what was your basis for determining that the tank in
18 Count 3 was in temporary closure?

19 A I was told.

20 Q Who were you told by?

21 A I was told by the operator, and I was also told by
22 Ms. Twilah Monroe that those were in temporary closure,
23 although I had --

24 Q "Those" or "that"?

25 A Excuse me?

1 Q "Those tanks" or "that tank"?

2 A That tank, that particular tank.

3 Q In Count 3?

4 A Yes.

5 Q Does Count -- does Count 3 --

6 A Yes.

7 Q -- have one tank or more than one tank?

8 A Just one tank.

9 Q One tank? Thank you. Have you -- did you conclude
10 your discussion of Count 4 sufficiently?

11 A I think I have. Essentially, that was a matrix of
12 1,500. There was no violator-specific increase or
13 decrease. The environmental sensitivity was just 1. It
14 had a factor for one year, they should have had release
15 detection for at least one year; 366 days, factor of
16 three, five tanks, ends up to be \$22,500. And there was
17 no -- and plus the economic benefit.

18 And again, the economic benefit was a delayed cost of
19 putting equipment in, whether it's an ATG, monitoring
20 wells, or some kind of a system in there that would be a
21 monthly monitoring.

22 Again, I try to use my best judgment in how much it
23 would cost, and I'm probably -- probably low, but I had to
24 come up with some kind of rationale.

25 Q Okay. Thank you. We'll proceed now to Count 7,

1 since Counts 5 and 6 have been withdrawn.

2 Mr. Cernerero, first, would you explain what Count 7
3 is --

4 A Okay.

5 Q And then --

6 A Right.

7 Q -- walk us through --

8 A Count 7 was, "Failure to Operate Cathodic Protection
9 System Continuously." And I think this is -- I forgot
10 what station this is. I think it was the Thrif-T -- my
11 recollection is not really good which one this was. I
12 think it was the --

13 Q Count 7, we've now -- exactly. The record -- it's
14 been put on the record that count -- you know, the counts
15 that each -- that correspond with each facility, and
16 Count 7 does correspond to the Citgo Thrift or
17 Thrif-T-Mart.

18 A Okay. And again, this one, we did not feel like the
19 fact that they were not operating it continuously (sic).
20 Again, the economic benefit did not seem -- I mean the --
21 yeah -- economic benefit seemed to be insignificant.

22 The only thing that they probably saved on was some
23 electricity, and I don't think I have the knowledge or the
24 information to determine what that electrical savings was,
25 so I just basically said it would be insignificant even if

1 we did calculate what the economic benefit is, so that was
2 zeroed out.

3 The only thing that we're dealing with on this one
4 would be the gravity base. And again, I picked a matrix
5 of the 1,500, because again, this is a major component of
6 the UST program, is corrosion protection for steel tanks.
7 Because if you have corrosion, you are going to end up
8 with -- with leaks.

9 Again, the -- when we were out there -- when I was
10 out there with the state, this particular facility, the
11 cathodic protection system was not in operation, and so
12 what we used was the matrix of 15.

13 We did not give any type of plus or minuses for
14 violator-specific.

15 It was a non -- environmental sensitive area is 1;
16 however, we used the date of the last CP test that was
17 done --

18 Q Mr. Cernerio, I need to interject and ask you to back
19 up for me.

20 A Okay.

21 Q Regarding the matrix component.

22 A Okay.

23 Q Could you explain the -- why you calculated what you
24 calculated for the matrix, regarding degree of harm and
25 extent of deviation from the requirements for this count.

1 A The reason for -- again, deviation -- or potential
2 for harm; if you have an Underground Storage Tank that --
3 that's metal and is not being protected from corrosion, it
4 will continue to corrode; particularly, when it's an older
5 tank, it's going to continue to corrode.

6 It could cause a release. I didn't say it did cause
7 a release, but it has potential, high potential for
8 causing a release; therefore, the potential for harm would
9 be considered major.

10 Potential for deviation from the requirements, again,
11 was considered major, because one of the three things that
12 have to be done or the three major components of an
13 Underground Storage Tank requirements is: One, release
14 detection; spill and overflow; corrosion protection.

15 This one was -- did not have corrosion protection at
16 the time of the inspection; therefore, the matrix was
17 used, it was 1,500, which also was recommended in the --
18 in the penalty policy, also.

19 So the \$1,500 was considered -- it was considered a
20 major -- a major deviation from the regulations and a
21 major potential for harm; therefore, it ended up to be a
22 matrix of 1,500.

23 Q Mr. Cerner, you say that there was a high potential
24 for release without the system operating. Why is that?

25 A Because without a cathodic protection system, the

1 corrosion will continue to occur; although it does slowly,
2 it will continue to occur over a period of time. Given
3 the fact that the tank -- some of the tanks that were
4 there were already aged, failure to have cathodic
5 protection is going to cause corrosion.

6 Q Okay.

7 A Corrosion will not be stopped.

8 Q Thank you. You were earlier getting into your
9 explanation of the days of noncompliance. Could you
10 explain your basis for the days of noncompliance?

11 A Okay. I had to determine when did the particular
12 cathodic protection system fail? The only data that I had
13 was a report that came out on March 14th of '04 that
14 essentially said that there was -- one of the anodes was
15 not up to the .85 volts or 850 millivolts, and should have
16 been replaced. So it was an indication that that -- that
17 was probably the time that it had failed, in my opinion.

18 It ends up to be 334 days of noncompliance. It was
19 from that date to the date that I did the inspection.

20 Also, when I was there, I did turn the box on to see
21 if there was current flowing. Current flowed for maybe
22 about 20 seconds and then shut off. It indicated to me
23 there was either some kind of a short or some kind of
24 malfunction of the -- of the box.

25 Q Mr. Cernero?

1 A Yes.

2 Q How many times do you recall did you try to turn the
3 system on?

4 A Twice. At least twice. We tried -- we tried to turn
5 it on and we tried to get -- the inspector from OCC, we
6 also tried to get a reading on it to see if we can get
7 a -- see what the potential was. And we never did get the
8 reading that was up to 850 millivolts.

9 Q And approximately how long did this system remain on
10 before shutting off?

11 A Oh, maybe a minute or two. It did not stay on very
12 long. So it indicated to me there was some -- some major
13 problems with that particular piece of equipment.

14 Q And again, Mr. Cernero, at the time that you
15 concluded your inspection, was the CP system still off?

16 A Yes.

17 MS. BEAVER: Your Honor, I'd like permission to
18 approach the witness.

19 THE COURT: You may.

20 MS. BEAVER: Your Honor, I have Exhibit --
21 what's been marked as Respondent's Exhibit 23 in my
22 hand, which is what Mr. Cernero referred to earlier.

23 Q (By Ms. Beaver:) Mr. Cernero, you referred just a
24 minute ago to the component that was below the -- if I'm
25 correct -- .850 millivolts.

1 A Right.

2 Q Did I characterize that correctly?

3 A Eight hundred fifty millivolts.

4 Q Eight hundred and fifty millivolts?

5 A Yes.

6 Q What component was that, based on the Respondent's
7 Exhibit 23 that you have there?

8 A It was the unleaded -- unleaded pump, submersible
9 pump. It said in the report by the company that did the
10 readings, it said "the unleaded pump readings are low,
11 cannot adjust" -- and it's hard to read what that says.

12 And then, "one five-pound anode would correct the
13 problem."

14 The readings on that location that was said low was
15 the location number 16 on the report, and it was below the
16 850 millivolts or .85 volts.

17 Q And in your -- and characterize for me, again, what
18 your interpretation of that component is regarding this
19 violation.

20 A It's the -- the component is the pump -- they call it
21 the pump manifold, which is the -- the portion of the pump
22 and motor that is visible from the surface. It does
23 contain -- routinely contains product, it was in contact
24 with the soil, it should be protected from corrosion.
25 Apparently, the voltage that was being generated by the

1 anodes at that -- for that particular area was not
2 sufficient.

3 Also, I look at the second -- the third page of this,
4 at the rectifier reading, in 19 -- as late as December 1st
5 of '99, for some reason, it shows that the volts and the
6 amps were zero.

7 So I conclude, also, that at least for that
8 particular year, most of the time, there was no current
9 flowing into that rectifier box. So I used this as my
10 time from when it started to fail.

11 Q Do you have any -- do you have any -- was there any
12 evidence to show that the system had been repaired?

13 A No, I don't have any evidence.

14 Q Why -- if you look at -- the purpose of that piece
15 of -- that document that you have there, the purpose of
16 that is to record what?

17 A This is what they call the half-cell test; it's done
18 at least -- it has to be done under regulations at least
19 once every three years. And that's what this test was; it
20 was to determine whether this cathodic protection system
21 was actually operating properly in accordance with the
22 regulations.

23 Q And does that document, Respondent's Exhibit 23,
24 indicate that the corrosion protection system was
25 operating properly on 3-19 of '04?

1 A It does say, "passed."

2 It says, "is the cathodic protection system working
3 properly?" It says "yes," which is on 3-19 -- or yeah,
4 3-19-04.

5 Q So how do you reconcile, Mr. Cernero, the apparent
6 discrepancy between the documents showing that the system
7 passed for corrosion protection, and yet it has a
8 component that's shown to be below the requirement.

9 A I don't -- either -- either it was missed, it was not
10 passed, or it was not realized that it had -- it had
11 failed. And the inspector or whoever, the company that
12 did this said it did pass, or there was something happen
13 between then and that, there was a repair. But there was
14 no documentation, as far as that was given to me, that
15 showed that this was ever repaired.

16 Q So in looking at Respondent's Exhibit 23, does that
17 document indicate or communicate to you that a repair had
18 been made --

19 A No.

20 Q -- on the system?

21 A No. It just -- it shows that there was a -- there
22 was a deficiency. For some reason, it was shown that it
23 did pass, or the contractor that did this said it passed.
24 However, when I was in -- and also, this shows that there
25 was no -- there was no current flowing through the

1 rectifier in '99.

2 I don't know what really all that means, but there is
3 discrepancies. The fact that the cathodic protection
4 system was not working while I was there definitely was in
5 violation.

6 Now, when that violation actually occurred, all I had
7 to go by is what the records were shown to me by
8 Ms. Twilah Monroe, and in subsequent information I have
9 received from the Respondent.

10 Q And have you received any evidence to this point that
11 a repair had been made?

12 A Not to my knowledge, no.

13 Q Have you received anything?

14 A No, I have not received anything.

15 Q Okay. So that was -- you were discussing days of
16 noncompliance, still on Count 7.

17 A Right. And because of the -- I went back to that
18 report, knowing that at least at that time, there was a
19 deficiency. I used that date, which it should have
20 been -- well, I have 3-14-04, but it was 3-19 -- again to
21 the date that I did the inspection was 331 (sic) days of
22 noncompliance. The factor 2.5 was used.

23 And, of course, I already talked about the matrix was
24 1,500 times 1 times 1 times 2.5 times three tanks, ends up
25 to be 11,250. We basically zeroed out the economic

1 benefit. So Count 7 ended up to be \$11,250.

2 Q Okay, Mr. Cernero, moving to Count 8.

3 A Okay. Count 8 is "Failure to Test Automatic Line
4 Leak Detectors Annually." And essentially, on this one, I
5 I said the economic benefit component was evaluated for
6 avoided costs and delayed costs. Only the avoided cost
7 was considered in this count.

8 Since RAM, Incorporated, did not conduct annual tests
9 of the Automatic Leak Detector every year, we assume that
10 conducting the test would cost approximately \$100 per UST
11 for each year period.

12 Again, using the factor of 7.8 for the inflation,
13 three percent for -- I'm sorry, 7.8 for the discount rate,
14 three percent for inflation, and 38.9 percent for the tax
15 rate, and 94 days of not -- of avoidance, the avoided cost
16 was \$63.65 per detector, Automatic Line Leak Detector, for
17 the total of \$190.95. Again, it wasn't all that much, but
18 I went ahead and calculated it anyway.

19 As far as the gravity base is concerned, again, the
20 failure to test these Automatic Line Leak Detectors is
21 very important on an annual basis.

22 An Automatic Line Leak Detector is essentially a
23 mechanical or electrical -- electronic mechanism that
24 prevents a catastrophic leak from a pressurized line if it
25 should break or it should be a massive leak. It's very

1 important.

2 On a pressurized system, EPA requires -- and the
3 state does, also -- requires two mechanisms or two methods
4 for preventing releases; one is the Automatic Line Leak
5 Detector, which will prevent a catastrophic release. It
6 will detect a three-gallon per -- three-gallon per hour
7 leak.

8 And then it's also required that the lines be tested
9 once -- at least once a year or have a monthly monitoring
10 that would detect down to a .1-gallon per hour leak. So
11 you have to actually have two mechanisms.

12 This particular count only has to do with Automatic
13 Line Leak Detector. And under the regulations, Automatic
14 Line Leak Detectors must also be checked on an annual
15 basis to ensure that they're working.

16 It's very similar to an emergency brake on your car.
17 If that emergency brake is not working and your brakes
18 fail, you are -- you know, you are going to have a
19 problem.

20 And it's required under the regulations that the
21 Automatic Line Leak Detector be checked at least once a
22 year, according to the manufacturer.

23 Therefore, I had to come up with a matrix. The
24 matrix on this particular one was, again, major-major.
25 Major potential for harm. If the Automatic Line Leak

1 Detector was not checked, then it would be a potential for
2 the fact that the Automatic Line Leak Detector would not
3 function properly, could cause a catastrophic leak.

4 Deviation from the requirements. It says that you
5 must have an Automatic Line Leak Detector checked at least
6 once every 12 months.

7 COURT REPORTER: Excuse me. Would you slow down
8 just a little bit?

9 THE WITNESS: Oh, I'm sorry.

10 COURT REPORTER: Thank you.

11 THE WITNESS: So therefore, the matrix was
12 \$1,500 in this particular case. There was no
13 violators -- do you have any questions?

14 Q (By Ms. Beaver:) I do. My question is, if you can
15 explain for me your period of noncompliance.

16 A Okay.

17 Q And how you calculated the period of noncompliance.

18 A Apparently -- in this particular situation, the test
19 for the Automatic Line Leak Detector was due -- the first
20 test I had, I think it was November 14th of '04 -- '03,
21 I'm sorry.

22 The next test should have been done by November 14th
23 of '04. So the violation was from November 14th, '04,
24 when it was supposed to have been done -- that was the
25 12-month span of time that it had to be -- it was the last

1 day it could have been done to be in compliance.

2 However, it was not done at the time of the
3 inspection of February 16th, '05; therefore, it ended up
4 to be 94 days of noncompliance, which is a factor of 1.5.

5 And the matrix is 1,500.

6 The violator-specific was 1.

7 Sensitivity is 1.

8 Days of noncompliance is 1.5 times three tanks, ended
9 up to be \$6,750.

10 MS. BEAVER: May I have a second, Your Honor,
11 please?

12 THE COURT: Sure.

13 (An off-the-record conversation was held, after
14 which the following continued:)

15 MS. BEAVER: Thank you, Your Honor.

16 Q (By Ms. Beaver:) Okay. Mr. Cernero, let's see. I
17 don't know if there are any missing components of Count 8
18 that we need to explain. I think you covered them all.

19 A Okay.

20 Q Okay. Count 9.

21 A Count 9 was "Failure to Test Pressurized Lines
22 Annually for Use -- or Use Monthly Monitoring."

23 The economic component was evaluated for avoided cost
24 and delayed cost only. Or only -- or only the avoided
25 cost, I'm sorry, was considered for this count.